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Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria∗
Ulrik Brandes† Martin Hoefer‡ Bobo Nick§
Abstract
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) [11] to
allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph,
and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For each edge a player must pay a cost
α, and the individual cost for a player represents a trade-off between edge costs and shortest
path lengths to all other players. We extend the model to a penalized game (PCG), for which
we reduce the penalty counted towards the individual cost for a pair of disconnected players
to a finite value β. Our analysis concentrates on existence, structure, and cost of disconnected
Nash and strong equilibria. Although the PCG is not a potential game, pure Nash equilibria
always and pure strong equilibria very often exist. We provide tight conditions under which
disconnected Nash (strong) equilibria can evolve. Components of these equilibria must be Nash
(strong) equilibria of a smaller NCG. However, in contrast to the NCG, for almost all parameter
values no tree is a stable component. Finally, we present a detailed characterization of the price
of anarchy that reveals cases in which the price of anarchy is Θ(n) and thus several orders of
magnitude larger than in the NCG. Perhaps surprisingly, the strong price of anarchy increases
to at most 4. This indicates that global communication and coordination can be extremely
valuable to overcome socially inferior topologies in distributed selfish network design.
1 Introduction
Networks are ubiquitous in modern society. It is therefore not surprising that the study of network
creation has attracted much research interest from various disciplines. In recent years, it has been
understood that the distributed formation of networks may be subject to economic considerations.
In particular, the creation of social, economic, and computational networks was formulated as a
game with selfish agents. A general framework for such an approach was proposed by Jackson and
Wolinsky [14]. In their games there are n players and each player is a vertex in a graph. A strategy
consists of choosing which incident edges to build. Depending on the network structure there is a
payoff for each player, and players adjust their strategy to maximize their payoff. A general finding
was that there are games, in which no efficient network is stable for a concept of pairwise stability,
which requires bilateral consent to construct a connection. The extensions and adjustments to this
model are numerous [13]. In particular, several works extended the model to unilateral link creation
and the Nash equilibrium as stability concept [5, 9].
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A particularly interesting variant was proposed in the context of distributed systems and the
Internet by Fabrikant et al. [11]. In their network creation game (NCG) the cost of creating an
edge is fixed to a parameter α. Edge creation is unilateral, and the cost for a player is a trade-
off between the costs for created edges and the structural position in the network measured by
shortest path distances to all other players. In [11] and consecutive work [2, 8] the inefficiency
of Nash equilibria was quantified using the price of anarchy, which captures the deterioration in
cost of the worst Nash equilibrium against a social optimal state. The presently known results on
the price of anarchy are summarized in Figure 1. Other equilibrium concepts were also studied,
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Figure 1: Price of anarchy in the NCG
e.g. existence and cost of pairwise stable equilibria [7], or of strong equilibria [3]. Extensions to
more general edge costs or different player cost trade-offs proved useful in the analysis of mobile
peer-to-peer networks [1, 10,17].
In network analysis [6], the inverse of the sum of shortest path lengths is one of the most
commonly used measures of centrality known as closeness [12]. A problem with closeness is that
global connectivity is required for the scores to be comparable. This means that in the NCG for
moderate to high edge costs the trade-off is distorted by the enforcement of connectivity. Thus, it
was not surprising that trees proved to be a prominent equilibrium structure [11].
In this paper, we remedy this problem by replacing the infinite cost of not being connected
by a finite penalty β. This corresponds directly to a variant of closeness centrality proposed by
Botafogo et al. [18]. This is also closely related to a measure termed radiality [19], although here
β depends on the network structure. Such an adjustment to the NCG was also suggested as an
open problem in [11]. Our penalized network creation game (PCG) is introduced in Section 2. β
allows to level off the infinite penalities for disconnectivity and to study the effect of the connection
requirement in the NCG on topology and social cost of Nash equilibria. Since the cost of connected
equilibria is the same as in the NCG, we will be most interested in existence, structure, and cost
of disconnected Nash equilibria. Naturally, if β is high, then Nash equilibria of the PCG reveal
the same properties as those of the NCG. It is thus not surprising that a number of insights for
the NCG can be translated directly to the PCG. If β decreases, then properties of Nash equilibria
can change. In particular, an interesting insight gained from our structural analysis in Section 3
is presented in Theorem 3.2. It shows that the prevalent tree structures of the NCG are absent in
disconnected Nash equilibria whenever α > 1 or β > 2.
Our analysis on the existence of disconnected networks offers relevant insight for the analysis
of distributed networks with rational agents. In many scenarios, a priori, a given set of selfish
entities has no intrinsic motivation to create a globally connected network. In contrast, our findings
indicate a peculiar absence of non-empty disconnected stable networks, which indicate underlying
incentives that prohibit their emergence. We failed to identify any non-empty disconnected Nash
equilibrium for β > 3. In addition, structural conditions like constant diameter in all known
equilibrium topologies for the NCG led us to conjecture that there is a constant β′ such that the
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empty network is the only disconnected Nash equilibrium for any PCG with β > β′. This appears
somewhat suprising, because the agents in the PCG are not explicitly forced into connection. In
addition, it reveals that in terms of topology of Nash equilibria the assumption of infinite penalties
in the NCG is not a significant drawback.
In addition, we consider the price of anarchy in Section 4. There are parameter values, for which
disconnected Nash equilibria appear but the social optimum is connected, which could lead to an
unbounded price of anarchy. However, we show that the price of anarchy in the PCG is always
bounded by O(n). In addition, Theorem 4.3 reveals cases with tightness and a matching lower bound
of Ω(n). This bound is strictly larger than any of the known bounds for the NCG. In Section 5
we contrast these findings with the scenario, in which players can play joint coordinated deviations
and consider strong equilibria. Unless α and β are within a small range, the social optimum is also
a strong equilibrium (see Theorem 5.1). In Theorem 5.2 we prove that the price of anarchy for
strong equilibria is at most 4. This reveals that in the PCG Nash equilibria can be several orders
of magnitude more costly than strong equilibria, a question which is still unsolved for the NCG.
More generally, it shows that joint and coordinated actions of selfish agents can drastically reduce
inefficiencies in selfish network creation. Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents some problems
for further research.
2 The Model and Initial Results
The network connection game (NCG) is a tuple (V, α) and can be described as follows. The set of
players V is the set of vertices of a graph. Possible edges {i, j} ∈ V × V have cost α. A strategy
si of a player i is a subset si ⊂ V \{v} and indicates, which edges player i chooses to build. In this
way a strategy vector s induces a set of edges between the players. Given a strategy vector s the
individual cost for a player i is
ci(s) = α|si|+
∑
j 6=i
dists(i, j),
where α > 0 and dists(i, j) is the length of a shortest-path in the undirected graph Gs = (V,Es)
induced by the strategy vector s. Note that Gs is assumed to be undirected, i.e., each edge can
be traversed in any direction, independent of which player pays for it. In the regular connection
game dists(i, j) =∞ if players i and j are in different components of Gs. In the penalized network
creation game (PCG) we are given a penalty value β > 1, and dists(i, j) = β for players i and
j in different components. A pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is a state s, in which no player can
unilaterally decrease his cost ci by changing his strategy si. We will restrict our attention to pure
equilibria throughout the paper. The social cost c(s) of a state s is simply c(s) =
∑
i∈V ci(s). A
social optimum state s∗ is a state with minimum social cost. Note that for the cost of a state it does
not matter, who builds an edge, and hence we will sometimes consider the graph Gs instead of s.
States that play an important role in the analysis of the PCG are the empty state s∅ = (∅, . . . , ∅),
sK corresponding to the complete graph, in which each edge {i, j} with i 6= j is paid by player
min{i, j}, and sZ corresponding to a center-sponsored star, in which one player purchases edges to
all other players.
Fabrikant et al. [11] show that there is always a pure NE in the NCG and mention that it
might be found by iterative improvement steps. Finding a best-response for a player in a NCG,
however, was shown NP-hard [11], and this translates to the PCG for sufficiently large penalty
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Figure 2: A game with k = 4 and 4 < α < 6 with cycling better response iteration. Black dots
indicate the player who pays for the edge.
cost. In addition, we show that better-response dynamics may cycle, hence the game is no potential
game [16]. As the dynamics involve no disconnectivities, the result follows directly for the PCG.
Nevertheless, in the PCG there is always a pure NE. This serves as a first insight to motivate the
further study of the properties of pure NE in the PCG.
Theorem 2.1 Every PCG has a pure Nash equilibrium, but neither NCG nor PCG are potential
games.
Proof. We first prove the non-existence of a potential function by contradiction. For any α > 3
choose an integer k with k < α < 3k
2
. Now construct a strategy combination for n = 4k players as
depicted in Figure 2. The following steps each represent a strict improvement for the players: (1)
player 4 removes edge e1, (2) player 2 removes edge e2, (3) player 4 builds edges e1 and e2. The
resulting state is isomorphic to the initial state, in which the roles of players 2 and 4 and edges e1
and e3 are switched. In particular, this allows us to construct an infinite improvement path, which
contradicts the existence of a potential function.
For the proof of existence let α ≥ β − 1 and consider s∅. For every player a strategy change
consists of connecting to a number t of other players. As tα + t − tβ = t(α − (β − 1)) ≥ 0, s∅
represents a NE. For 1 ≤ α < β− 1 consider the state sZ corresponding to a center-sponsored star,
in which the center player pays for all edges. Using the same argument as for s∅ it is not profitable
for the center player to remove any edges. For a leaf player connecting to additional t other leaf
players yields a difference of tα− t ≥ 0. Hence, the center-sponsored star represents a NE. Finally,
for α < 1 and α < β − 1 consider the state sK . Then, as α < 1 every edge removal that leaves the
graph connected cannot be profitable. The only possibility to disconnect the graph, however, is for
player 1 to remove all edges. This changes his cost by β(n − 1) − (α + 1)(n − 1) > 0. Hence, for
this case sK represents a NE. ⊓⊔
3 Disconnected Equilibria
In this section we consider existence and structural properties of disconnected NE in the PCG.
First, we clarify the existence of disconnected equilibria.
Theorem 3.1 For α ≥ β − 1 the empty graph is always a disconnected NE. For 0 < α < β − 1
there is no disconnected NE.
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Proof. The first part follows from Theorem 2.1. For the second part consider a player v in a
disconnected NE s. Let nv be the size of the component of the graph Gs, in which v is located.
Now suppose v changes his strategy by connecting to all n−nv players in other components. Then
the change is α(n − nv) + (n − nv) − β(n − nv) = (n − nv)(α − (β − 1)) < 0. Hence, under these
conditions every player in a disconnected state can decrease his individual cost. ⊓⊔
The theorem provides a tight characterization using the empty graph. An interesting issue,
however, is to explore whether non-empty disconnected NE are possible, because in many cases
the empty graph represents a rather unrealistic prediction for a stable network. Note that a
component of k players in a disconnected NE of a PCG with given α and β must be a NE in
the corresponding NCG with α and k players. There are a number of structures that have been
identified as components of NE in the NCG, in particular, graphs based on affine planes (including
the Petersen graph), cliques, cliques of star graphs, and trees [2]. In the following we consider each
of these classes and assume a size of at least 2 vertices to exclude the degenerate case of singleton
vertices. The treatment of affine plane graphs is cumbersome but rather straightforward, so we
omit details here. These graphs can represent NE for β < 3 and certain restricted values of α.
More information is available from the authors upon request.
3.1 Cliques and Cliques of Stars
We refer to a pair as a component consisting of two players linked by a single edge.
Lemma 3.1 For α > 1 there is no pair in a disconnected NE.
Proof. Assume there is a pair in a disconnected NE. As one of the players wants to keep the
edge, it must be that β − α − 1 ≥ 0, and with Theorem 3.1 α = β − 1. Now consider a different
player v that constructs an edge to a player from the pair. The change of the individual cost is
α− 2β + 3 = −α+ 1 < 0. Hence, the change is profitable, which proves that a pair cannot appear
in a disconnected NE. ⊓⊔
Similarly, for larger clique components it must be α ≤ 1, because otherwise a player from the
component removes one edge and accepts the increase in distance. Theorem 3.1 yields the following
direct corollary.
Corollary 3.1 For β > 2 there is no clique component in a disconnected NE.
A (k, l)-clique of stars is a clique with k vertices, in which each such node is the center of a star
of l vertices. We consider k ≥ 3, because otherwise the structure is a tree. In [2] it was shown that
a (k, l)-clique of stars, in which all edges are created by the players in the clique, is a NE for the
NCG with α = l. Here we show that the appearance of such a component in a disconnected NE is
quite limited.
Lemma 3.2 For α = l and k ≥ 3, a (k, l)-clique of stars, in which all edges are created by the
players in the clique, can be a component in a disconnected NE if and only if α = 1 and β = 2.
Proof. Consider a state s, which is a disconnected NE with a component C of a (k, l)-clique of
stars. In addition to the deviations considered in the NCG, for a component in a disconnected NE
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we must consider a split of the component and a connection of a vertex outside of the component.
For k ≥ 3 we can assign edge costs to the players such that no clique player is able to unilaterally
disconnect the clique. As all edges of the stars are also built by players from the clique, we must
have α+ 1− β ≤ 0, and hence with the general bound from Theorem 3.1 α = β − 1.
Consider a connection from a player outside the component to an arbitrary player v of the
clique. Hence,
α− klβ +
∑
w∈C
(dists(v,w) + 1) = α− klβ + (2kl − k − l) + kl ≥ 0.
It is α = l = β − 1, so we get as condition
0 ≤ l − kl(l + 1) + 3kl − k − l = −k(l2 − 2l + 1) = −k(l − 1)2.
Thus, l = α = 1 and β = α+ 1 = 2. It is straightforward to verify that under these conditions
the outlined state is a NE. ⊓⊔
3.2 Trees
Tree graphs are a structure whose appearance is wide-spread in the NCG [2, 11]. The following
analysis shows that this property is only due to the requirement that a NE must be connected. In
the PCG these structures can appear only in very special cases.
Lemma 3.3 For β > 2 every non-singleton player v in a disconnected NE has at least one incident
edge that was created by a different player w 6= v.
Proof. Consider a player v in a component C with k players, who pays for all his dv incident edges.
As we have a NE, it is not profitable for v to disconnect from C, i.e., αdv +
∑
w∈C dist(v,w) ≤
β(k − 1). Now consider a different player v′ not in C that chooses to connect to all neighbors of v.
As this must not be profitable, αdv +
∑
w∈C dist(v,w)+2 ≥ βk. Adding the two inequalities yields
β ≤ 2, which proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.4 Suppose there is a disconnected NE with a component C of k > 1 vertices. If α >
(k−1)(β−2)+1, then for every player v there is an incident edge paid by a different player w 6= v.
Proof. Suppose there is a player v that pays for all his dv ≥ 1 incident edges. As v does not want
to remove all edges, we have αdv +
∑
w∈C dist(v,w) ≤ β(k − 1), and thus
α ≤ 1
dv
(
β(k − 1)−
∑
w∈C
dist(v,w)
)
.
For every non-neighbor vertex of C we have distance at least 2, and thus
∑
w∈C dist(v,w) ≥
2(k − 1)− dv. Substitution yields α ≤ (k − 1)(β − 2) + 1 as desired. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3.2 For β > 2 or α > 1 no component of a disconnected NE is a tree.
Proof. The first bound is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.3 and the fact that for a tree
|E| = |V | − 1. Thus, for disconnected NE with tree components β ≤ 2, and the second bound
follows with Lemma 3.4. ⊓⊔
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3.3 Non-empty Equilibria
In the previous paragraphs we have shown that the appearance of known NE topologies from the
NCG as components in disconnected NE of the PCG is quite limited. The existence of disconnected
NE is guaranteed by the empty network. This raises the question, under which conditions on α
and β non-empty disconnected NE can evolve. We first present a positive result.
Lemma 3.5 For 3 ≤ α ≤ 4 and β ≤ (α + 11)/5 a cycle C5 of 5 vertices can be a component of a
disconnected NE.
Proof. Consider a disconnected NE with such a component. Label the players in C5 from 0 to
4 along a Euclidean tour. Each player i pays for edge (i, i + 1 mod 5). In this case no player can
disconnect the component. If a player removes his edge, the increase in distance cost is 4, thus
α ≤ 4. Furthermore, every vertex in the cycle has a sum of distances of 6. As for each vertex v 6∈ C5
it must not be profitable to connect to a vertex i ∈ C5, we get α ≥ 5β − 11. Every additional
edge yields a cost improvement of at most 3, hence for α ≥ 3 it is optimal for v to connect to at
most one vertex from C5. This means that for β ≤ α+115 ≤ 3 there can be a component C5 in a
disconnected NE. ⊓⊔
Note that a NE with C5 is transient and not strict, i.e., there is a sequence of strategy changes
that leaves the individual cost of the changing player identical, but leads into a non-equilibrium
state. For instance player 2 can exchange edge (2,3) by edge (2,4) without cost change. Afterwards
player 1 can strictly improve by purchasing (1,4) instead of (1,2).
In contrast to the restricted interval, for which we can show existence, there is an unbounded
region of parameter values, for which the empty network is the only disconnected network - in
particular if α or β are large compared to n.
Lemma 3.6 In a non-empty disconnected NE let nl be the minimum size and diaml the minimum
diameter of any non-singleton component. Then
(1) α < 12nl log nl (3) β < 1 + 14
√
nl log nl
(2) β ≤ 1 + 2 · diaml (4) if n > 6, then β < n/2
Proof. For the first bound consider α ≥ 12nl log nl and a component with nl players. This
component must represent a NE in a NCG with the same α and nl players, and thus according
to [2] must be a tree. This contradicts Theorem 3.2 and the bound follows.
Now consider a non-empty disconnected NE s for β > 2, and let C be a non-singleton compo-
nent. As C is no tree, it must contain at least one cycle. Let U be a smallest of all cycles in C,
and let v be an arbitrary player that constructed some edge e of U . Denote by s′ the state that
evolves if player v removes edge e. Note that by this removal no additional pair of players gets
disconnected. As s is a NE, we have
α ≤
∑
w∈C
(dists′(v,w) − dists(v,w)). (1)
As we have chosen U to be of minimum size, all shortest distances between vertices of U are given
by the paths along the cycle. Thus, there is always a vertex u, for which the distances in s and s′
are the same. This yields
dists′(v,w) ≤ dists′(v, u) + dists′(u,w) = dists(v, u) + dists(u,w)
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for all w ∈ C. With nC = |C| we can conclude α ≤ 2nC · diam(C) − ∑w∈C dists(v,w). On
the other hand, no vertex outside C must be able to profit from a connection to v, hence α +
nC +
∑
w∈C dist(v,w) ≥ nCβ. The last two inequalities imply that β ≤ 2 · diam(C) + 1 and thus
deliver the second bound. As each component C must be a NE of a NCG, we know from [11]
that diam(C) ≤ √4α + 1. Together with the first bound on α shown above this implies the third
bound β < 1 + 14
√
nl log nl. For the proof of the last bound the inequality (1) and the bound
α+ nC +
∑
w∈C dist(v,w) ≥ nCβ imply
β ≤ 1 + 1
nC
∑
w∈C
dists′(v,w)
The sum of distances for v is maximal iff C in s is a cycle and thus in s′ is a chain with v being
one of its endpoints. In this case
∑
w∈C
dists′(v,w) ≤ (nC − 1)nC
2
.
If C is not a cycle in s, then the inequality is strict and the previous formulas yield β < 1+ nC−1
2
=
nC+1
2
≤ n
2
. If C is a cycle in s, it is straightforward to show that it must hold nC ≤ 5 as s is a NE.
Here we use the assumption that n > 6 and get β ≤ nC+1
2
≤ 3 < n
2
. This proves the last bound. ⊓⊔
In contrast to these bounds, we have not been able to derive any non-empty disconnected NE
for values of β > 3. This led us to formulate the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.1 (Constant Penalty Conjecture) There is a constant β′ such that for β > β′
the only disconnected NE is s∅.
Note that our bounds imply that if the conjecture is false, then there must be non-tree NE in the
NCG with a diameter in ω(1). This seems quite unlikely, as all non-tree NE found so far have
diameter at most 3.
4 Price of Anarchy
In this section we consider the price of anarchy in the PCG. We first present an overview of the
social optima of the game in Figure 3.
Theorem 4.1 The social optimum is s∗ = s∅ for 2β − 2 < α < 2, as well as for α ≥ max{2, βn−
2(n−1)}. It holds that s∗ = sK in the range α ≤ min{2, 2β−2}. In the remaining range the social
optimum is s∗ = sZ.
Proof. First, assume α ≤ 2. In this case α + 2 ≤ 4 ≤ 2dists(v,w) for every indirectly connected
pair of players. Hence, a direct connection can only result in smaller social cost. If in addition
2β − 2 ≤ α, then disconnectivity is the cheapest alternative and thus s∅ is optimal. Otherwise, for
2β − 2 ≥ α the state sK corresponding to the complete graph is optimal.
In the case α > 2 and β ≤ 2 we have 2β − 2 < α and 2β ≤ 2dists(v,w) for any dists(v,w) ≥ 2.
Hence, s∅ represents a social optimum.
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Figure 3: Social optima in the PCG
For α ≥ βn − 2(n − 1) and β ≥ 2 consider a state s corresponding to a non-empty graph Gs.
Suppose C is a non-singleton component of Gs and nC = |C| > 1. By c(C) we consider only the
costs introduced by pairs of players in C, and by mC the number of edges within component C. It
is easy to note c(C) ≥ 2nC(nC −1)+(α−2)mC (see [11]). If s is a candidate for a social optimum,
component C must be a star. However,
c(C) ≥ 2nC(nC − 1) + (α− 2)mC ≥ 2nC(nC − 1) + nC(β − 2)(nC − 1) = nC(nC − 1)β. (2)
Thus, by removing all edges from non-singleton components we reduce the social cost of the state
even further. This implies that s∅ is a social optimum.
Finally, in the case 2 < α < βn− 2(n− 1) the cheapest connected state is sZ corresponding to
the star. We show here that for every disconnected state there is a strictly cheaper state. Hence,
no disconnected state can be a social optimum, and the social optimum remains sZ . This finishes
the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 4.1 If 2 < α < βn − 2(n − 1), then for each disconnected state s there is a state with
strictly less social cost.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there is a disconnected state s which is the social optimum.
Similarly to the last paragraph we see that the components of s must be stars. In addition, s must
have at least one non-singleton component, because s∅ is more costly than sZ :
n(n− 1)β > (n− 1)(α + 2n− 2) = α(n − 1) + 2(n− 1)2.
Suppose s has two (star) components C1 and C2 of n1 and n2 players, respectively, and assume
n1 > 1. We will consider two different states, which both must not be cheaper. This delivers a
contradiction.
On the one hand, suppose we remove all edges from C1 and instead connect all players of C1 to
the center player of C2. Then regarding players v 6∈ C1 ∪ C2 there is no cost change. We need one
additional edge for the center player v1 of C1. Every other player from C1 is now at a distance of
2 to v1, thus there is an increase in distance of 2(n1 − 1). For the newly created distances between
players of C1 and C2 we have ∑
v∈C1,w∈C2
dist(v,w) = 2(n2 − 1)n1 + n1,
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which is counted twice in the social cost. However, we save a penalty of 2n1n2β. By assumption
the total changes must not lead to an improved state, hence
α+ 2(n1 − 1) + 4(n2 − 1)n1 + 2n1 − 2n1n2β ≥ 0.
Thus, α ≥ 2 − 4n1n2 + 2n1n2β. On the other hand, consider the change in cost when we remove
all edges from C1. Again, by assumption this must not lead to a cheaper state, so
α(n1 − 1) + 2(n1 − 1)2 ≤ n1(n1 − 1)β.
This implies α ≤ n1β−2(n1−1). Combining the bounds leads to n1(β−2)+2 ≥ 2−4n1n2+2n1n2β,
which implies 4n2 − 2 ≥ β(2n2 − 1) and thus β ≤ 2, which is a contradiction to 2 < βn− 2(n− 1).
⊓⊔
For α < β − 1 we have seen in Theorem 3.1 that no disconnected NE exists. In addition, the
next theorem shows that in this case a finite penalty for disconnectivity cannot disrupt any NE of
the NCG. Hence, for this parameter range the price of anarchy is identical to the NCG.
Theorem 4.2 For α < β − 1 the NE of the PCG are exactly the NE of the NCG, so in this
parameter range the prices of anarchy and stability remain the same in the PCG as in the NCG,
respectively.
Proof. As in this parameter range all NE of the PCG must be connected, every such state must
also be a NE in the NCG, because in the PCG the players only consider more potentially profitable
deviations. For the converse, suppose for contradiction that there is a NE s of the NCG, which is
not a NE in the PCG. As s must be connected, there is a player v, who profits from changing her
strategy sv to a strategy s
′
v that disconnects the resulting graph. Let W be the set of other players,
to which v is disconnected under s′ = (s′v, s−v). Now suppose v changes his strategy again to s
′′
v by
building direct connections to all players fromW . As α+1 < β, this is again a profitable deviation.
Thus, player v strictly profits from switching from sv to s
′′
v . Note, however, that in s
′′ = (s′′v , s−v)
the resulting graph is connected, thus s′′v must be a feasible deviation yielding profit for v in the
NCG. This contradicts the assumption that s is a NE in the NCG. ⊓⊔
In general, however, the price of anarchy for the PCG can be strictly larger than for the NCG.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the bounds we obtained. Note that all these bounds are in O(n)
for the respective parameter values. Our proof is divided into ranges, in which different network
structures are social optima.
4.1 Star Graph
At first, we concentrate on the case max{2, β − 1} < α < βn− 2(n− 1), in which disconnected NE
can appear and the star is the social optimum.
We start by observing a helpful reduction to the price of anarchy in the NCG. Consider a discon-
nected NE s with non-singleton components C1, . . . , Cr and singleton components Cr+1, . . . , Cr+l.
Let ni = |Ci| and c(Ci) be the cost of Ci as a NE in a NCG with ni players. In particular, c(Ci)
counts only edge and shortest path costs within Ci but no penalties. In addition, let sZi be a social
optimum state for a NCG with ni players. For the given parameter range of α all the sZi are stars.
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Figure 4: Price of anarchy in the PCG
Lemma 4.2 For the cost of s it holds that
c(s)
c(sZ)
≤ nβ
α+ 2(n− 1) + max1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
.
Proof. Obviously it holds that
c(s) = 2β

 ∑
1≤i<j≤r+l
ninj

+ r∑
i=1
c(Ci) ≤ βn(n− 1) +
r∑
i=1
c(Ci).
With n = l +
∑r
i=1 ni we can bound as follows
∑r
i=1 c(Ci)
c(sZ)
=
r∑
i=1
(
c(Ci)c(sZi)
c(sZi)c(sZ)
)
≤ max
1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
·
r∑
i=1
c(sZi)
c(sZ)
= max
1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
·
r∑
i=1
(ni − 1)α+ 2(ni − 1)2
(n− 1)α+ 2(n − 1)2
= max
1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
· α
∑r
i=1(ni − 1) + 2
∑r
i=1(ni − 1)2
(n− 1)α + 2(n − 1)2
< max
1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
,
which proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4.3 For 2β − 2 ≤ α ≤ nβ − 2(n− 1) the price of anarchy is bounded by
Θ
(
nβ
α
)
for α ≥ 12n log n, O
(
5
√
logn log n+
nβ
α+ n
)
for α < 12n log n .
For β − 1 ≤ α ≤ 2β − 2 the price of anarchy is Θ(min{β, n}).
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Proof. For the proof of the first bound consider α ≥ 12n log n. According to Lemma 3.6 in this
case every NE is either connected or s∅. For α ≥ 12n log n all connected NE have a constant price
of anarchy [2], while s∅ leads to an increase and proves our first bound:
c(s∅)
c(sZ)
=
βn
α+ 2(n − 1) ∈ Θ
(
nβ
α
)
. (3)
This bound increases from Θ(1) to Θ(n) if α drops from nβ−2(n−1) to 2β−2. It also shows that
the price of anarchy induced by s∅ is never more than O(n) for s
∗ = sZ and α ≥ β − 1. Another
range, for which s∅ is the most expensive NE, is β− 1 ≤ α ≤ 2β− 2 with β ≥ 7. Then any directly
connected pair induces a cost of α+ 2 ≤ 2β. Any indirectly connected pair in a NE induces a cost
2dists(v,w) ≤ 2
√
4α+ 1 ≤ 2√8β − 7 ≤ 2β. Thus, the cost of 2β induced by s∅ is maximal for
every pair of players. Therefore the fraction in Equation (3) characterizes the price of anarchy and
results in Θ(min{β, n}), which proves the third bound.
For the remaining range with α < 12n log n we cannot exclude the possibility that there are
worse disconnected NE than s∅. However, components of these NE must be connected NE of
smaller NCGs. Using Lemma 4.2 we can bound the price of anarchy for these NE by the sum of the
fraction for s∅ in Equation (3) plus the maximum factor of any component NE in the corresponding
NCG. With the bound of 5
√
logn log n ∈ o(nǫ) on the price of anarchy for the NCG [8] this proves
our second bound O
(
5
√
logn log n+ nβ
α+n
)
= O(max{5
√
logn log n,min{n, β}}). In particular, this
represents a bound of O(n) for the price of anarchy. ⊓⊔
4.2 Complete Graph
In this case we have s∗ = sK , and thus it must hold β − 1 ≤ α ≤ min{2, 2β − 2}. The following
theorem summarizes the bounds.
Theorem 4.4 The price of anarchy is bounded by 4/3 for α < 1, 4/3 for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 and β < 2,
and 3/2 for α < min{2, 2β − 2)} and β ≥ 2.
Proof. Suppose s is a NE and let C be a component. For any two players v,w ∈ C we have
dists(v,w) ≤ α + 1, because otherwise building a direct connection is profitable. Thus, for α < 1
there are no indirectly connected players. A directly connected pair of players yields a social cost
of α+ 2 ≤ 2β. Hence, the worst NE is s∅ and the price of anarchy is bounded by
c(s∅)
c(sK)
=
2β
α+ 2
≤ 2α+ 2
α+ 2
<
4
3
.
This proves the first bound. For 1 ≤ α < 2, the diameter is diam(C) ≤ 2 for every non-singleton
component of a NE s. Indirectly connected players yield a social cost of 2diam(C) ≤ 4 and directly
connected players α+ 2 < 4. If β < 2, then 2β < 4 for any disconnected pair of players. Thus, the
price of anarchy is bounded by
4(n(n − 1)/2)
c(sK)
=
4
α+ 2
≤ 4
3
,
which proves the second bound. In case β ≥ 2, we get 2β ≥ 4 ≥ α+ 2, so s∅ is the worst NE. For
the price of anarchy we get the third bound by
c(s∅)
c(sK)
≤ 2α+ 2
α+ 2
<
3
2
.
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⊓⊔
4.3 Empty Graph
In this case we have 2β − 2 < α < 2 or α ≥ max{2, βn − 2(n − 1)}. The following theorem
summarizes the bounds.
Theorem 4.5 The price of anarchy is bounded by 3/2 for 2β − 2 < α < 1, 2 for 1 ≤ α < 2 and
α > 2β − 2, and 1 for α ≥ 12n log n and α > βn − 2(n − 1). It is O(5
√
logn log n · α+n
nβ
) for the
remaining range.
Proof. In the range 2β−2 < α < 1 every component of a NE is a clique. Every directly connected
pair of players yields a contribution to the social cost of α+ 2 > 2β. For n > 2 we can assign the
edges of a complete graph to be purchased by the players such that no player can disconnect the
graph by removing his edges. Hence, the complete graph represents the worst NE and with
c(sK)
c(s∅)
=
α+ 2
2β
<
3
2
the first bound follows.
In the range 1 ≤ α < 2 and α > 2β − 2 every component has a diameter of at most 2. A
connected pair of players yields a social cost of at most 4 > 2β or 2 +α > 2β. Therefore the worst
NE is connected, has diameter at most 2, and as 4 > 2 + α as few edges as possible. This means
no NE can be more costly than the star graph (which does not represent a NE here). The price of
anarchy is bounded by
c(sZ)
c(s∅)
=
α(n − 1) + 2(n − 1)2
βn(n− 1) < 2 ,
which proves the second bound.
Note that for α ≥ 12n log n Lemma 3.6 shows that NE can only be connected or empty.
Lemma 3.4 then shows for α > nβ − 2(n − 1) that s∅ is the only NE in this range. Hence,
we get a price of anarchy of 1.
For the remaining range of 2 ≤ α < 12n log n and α > βn−2(n−1) we use a bounding argument
over the components of a disconnected NE. Similar as for the price of anarchy consider a discon-
nected NE s with non-singleton components C1, . . . , Cr and singleton components Cr+1, . . . , Cr+l.
Let ni = |Ci| and c(Ci) be the cost of Ci as a NE in a NCG with ni players. In particular, c(Ci)
counts only edge and shortest path costs within Ci but no penalties. In addition, let sZi be a state
for a NCG with ni players representing a star graph. Then Lemma 4.2 tells us that
r∑
i=1
c(Ci)
c(sZ)
< max
1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
.
Similarly to Lemma 4.2 we can bound c(s) ≤ βn(n− 1)+∑ri=1 c(Ci), and thus get the third bound
c(s)
c(s∅)
≤ 1 + c(sZ)
c(s∅)
r∑
i=1
c(Ci)
c(sZ)
< 1 +
c(sZ)
c(s∅)
max
1≤i≤r
{
c(Ci)
c(sZi)
}
∈ O
(
5
√
logn log n · α+ n
nβ
)
.
Note that by restriction to α < 12n log n this bound is still in o(nǫ). ⊓⊔
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5 Strong Equilibria
In this section we assume agents are able to jointly deviate to different strategies. As stability
concept we consider the strong equilibrium [4], in which no coalition C of players can decrease the
cost for each of its members by taking a joint deviation. More formally, if a state s is a strong
equilibrium (SE), then for each coalition of players C and each possible strategy profile s′C for the
players in C it holds that if there is a player i ∈ C with ci(s′C , s−C) < ci(s), then there is another
player j ∈ C with cj(s′C , s−C) ≥ cj(s). The price of anarchy for SE is a straightforward adaption
of the price for NE. It was studied before in [3] for the NCG. The following theorem shows that
with the exception of a small range of parameter values strong equilibria always exist in the PCG.
Theorem 5.1 For α < β − 1 the SE of the PCG are exactly the SE of the NCG. For α ≥ β − 1
the social optimum is a SE for all parameter values except β < 3, and βn− 2n+2− (β− 1) < α <
βn− 2n+ 2.
Proof. The first part of the theorem can be proven directly along the lines of Theorem 3.1.
Consider a SE s of the NCG and suppose there is a profitable deviation of a coalition C that
creates a disconnected graph. Then reconnecting all players across components creates a connected
deviation that is cheaper for every player. This is a contradiction to s being a SE.
For the second part, we first note that for the case α = β − 1 we can use the arguments of
Theorem 3.1 to show that every SE of the NCG is also a SE of the PCG. Hence, using results
from [3] it holds that with the exception of α ∈ (1, 2) (respectively β ∈ (2, 3)) the social optimum
is a SE. For the remainder we thus focus on the range α > β − 1.
We will at first concentrate on the case, in which s∅ is a social optimum. In addition, we
assume β ≤ min{2, α
2
+ 1} holds. Let us consider a deviating coalition C of nC players that builds
a connected component, which is disconnected from the remaining n−nC players. In C there must
be at least one player v that pays for at least dv/2 (i.e., half of his incident) edges. It requires an
easy inductive argument to show that if such a player v does not exist, not all edges of C are being
paid for. For such a player we get a cost of
dvα/2 + dv + 2(nC − 1− dv) + β(n − nC)
≥ βdv + 2(nC − 1− dv) + β(n− nC)
≥ β(n − nC + dv) + β(nC − 1− dv) = β(n− 1).
Hence, player v ∈ C is not able to strictly decrease his cost.
For the remaining range of β > 2 and α ≥ βn− 2(n− 1) in which s∅ is optimal, we consider a
similar argument. Suppose a coalition C of nC players builds a connected network. Then the cost
of this network can be lower bounded as in Equation (2). Hence, the new average player cost in
C with respect to the coalition is at least β(nC − 1), which is exactly the cost of each player in s∅
with respect to players in C. This proves that whenever s∅ is optimal, it is a SE.
For the case, in which sK is optimal, it is known [3] that there is no connected SE for α ∈ (1, 2)
and n ≥ 7. If α ∈ (1, 2) and α/2 + 1 < β < α + 1, then sK is the unique social optimum. This
means that for β ∈ (1.5, 3) a social optimum might not be a SE.
For the remainder let us consider the range of β ≥ 3. For α ≤ 2 the game is equivalent to
a NCG, so sK is a SE for α ∈ [0, 1] and α = 2. Thus, we concentrate on the case α > 2 and
β < α + 1, in which the star sZ is the only social optimum and is not guaranteed to be a SE by
previous arguments. Suppose the star is periphery-sponsored, i.e., each leaf vertex pays for the
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incident edge. Then the star center will never participate in a deviation: As β > 2, disconnecting a
player can only increase the cost for him, and w.r.t. any connected component he can never achieve
a better cost. Hence, we focus on the leaf players. If a coalition C of nC leaf players chooses to
deviate, it cannot find a profitable deviation that leaves the network connected. This is a result
from the fact that the periphery-sponsored star is a SE in the NCG [3, Theorem 4.1]. Hence, let
us consider a deviating coalition that builds a connected component C, which is disconnected from
the remaining n− nC players.
Case 1: First, suppose in C there is a player that pays for an edge and has degree 1. For this
player a lower bound on his cost is given by α+ 1 + 2(nC − 2) + β(n− nC). If the deviation
is profitable for the coalition, we must have
α+ 2nC − 2 + β(n − nC) < α+ 2n − 3,
because otherwise the player would refuse to join. This gives β < 2, which contradicts β ≥ 3.
Case 2: Otherwise, suppose each player that pays for an edge in C has degree at least 2. We again
consider a player v, who pays for at least dv/2 edges. This player pays for at least one edge
and has cost at least dvα/2+ dv +2(nC − 1− dv)+β(n−nC). The player must be motivated
to join the coalition, and hence his cost must decrease:
dvα/2 + dv + 2(nC − 1− dv) + β(n− nC) < α+ 2n− 3
dvα− 2dv + 4nC + 2β(n− nC) < 2α+ 4n− 2
dv(α− 2) + 2β(n− nC) < 2α+ 4(n − nC)− 2
With dv ≥ 2 and nC ≤ n − 1 by assumption we have β < 2 + 1n−nC ≤ 3. This upper bound
is again tight. Consider a game with n = 5 players, in which the four leaf players deviate to
a cycle. This deviation can be profitable for any β < 3 and appropriate values of α.
Now consider deviations of a coalition of leaf players to the empty network. This can be
profitable if β(n − 1) < α + 2n − 3. Together with the optimality bound of sZ this yields β(n −
1)− 2n+ 3 < α < βn− 2n + 2, the second bound.
At last, consider deviations in which a part of the coalition C builds disconnected components,
while another part of the coalition possibly remains connected to the star of players outside C. For
the remaining range, in which the star sZ can be a SE, we can use the above arguments to show
that there must be a player in a newly created component that is not able to strictly decrease his
cost. This shows that sZ is indeed a SE in the remaining range. ⊓⊔
In combination with results from [3] the theorem shows for the case α < β − 1 that the price of
anarchy for SE is strictly larger than 1, but at most 2. The main result in this section is a general
constant upper bound on the price of anarchy for SE in the PCG.
Theorem 5.2 The price of anarchy for SE in the PCG is at most 4.
Proof. In case the complete graph is the social optimum, Theorem 4.4 shows that the price of
anarchy is at most 1.5. As the SE are a subset of the NE of a game, the theorem follows for this
case.
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We next show the bound for the empty network as optimum. Suppose s is a non-empty SE,
and consider any component Ci of s with ni = |Ci| > 1. Each player that pays for at least one edge
in Ci has cost at least α + ni − 1. A joint deviation of this set of players would be to delete all
edges, which would result in a cost of β(ni− 1) for each of them w.r.t. the players in Ci. Hence, it
must be that α+ ni − 1 ≤ β(ni − 1).
Note that connection and distance costs within components can be bounded as follows. Each
non-empty component Ci has at least one vertex vi with distance cost at most α+2ni− 3, because
otherwise the whole component could deviate jointly to the star and all decrease their cost w.r.t.
vertices from Ci. Thus, similarly to [2] and [3, Lemma 4.1] we can bound the distance and edge
costs within Ci by
(ni − 1)

2α+ ni − 1 + ∑
vj∈Ci,vj 6=vi
dist(vi, vj)


≤ 2α(ni − 1) + (ni − 1)2 + ni(α+ 2ni − 3)
≤ 3niβ(ni − 1)− 2ni − 2α+ 1 < 3niβ(ni − 1)
In addition, for each vertex in Ci there are penalties of β
∑
j 6=i nj. This yields
c(s)
c(s∅)
≤
∑
i 3niβ(ni − 1) + βni
∑
j 6=i nj
βn(n− 1) ≤ 1 + 3nmaxi
ni − 1
n(n− 1) ≤ 4,
and proves the bound for the empty network as social optimum.
If the star is the social optimum, then for each connected SE the price of anarchy for SE is at
most 2. Consider a disconnected SE with k components and number the components such that
n1 ≥ n2 ≥ ... ≥ nk. We can bound the price of anarchy for SE by the maximum factor achieved
by any component (see Lemma 4.2) in addition to the costs incurred by the penalties. As each
component must represent a SE, we have
c(s)
c(s∅)
≤ 2 +
∑
i niβ
∑
j 6=i nj
α(n − 1) + 2(n− 1)2 .
For the remaining part we focus on the penalties. Each player in component Ci has penalty exactly
β(n − ni). On the other hand, if all players join and create an additional star, then his new cost
for players outside Ci is at most α+ 2(n − ni) when being a leaf. This yields
β(n− n1) ≤ β(n− ni) ≤ α+ 2(n − ni) ≤ α+ 2(n − 1).
Therefore, α ≥ β(n− n1)− 2(n− 1), which allows us to bound∑
i niβ
∑
j 6=i nj
α(n − 1) + 2(n− 1)2 ≤
∑
i βni(n− ni)
β(n − 1)(n − n1)
Suppose that r := n−n1, then n1 = n− r and the number of non-connected vertex pairs is (n− r)r
for the pairs involving C1 and at most r
2 − r for the remaining components. Hence,∑
i niβ
∑
j 6=i nj
α(n− 1) + 2(n − 1)2 ≤
2β((n − r)r + r2 − r)
β(n− 1)r =
2β(n − 1)
β(n− 1) = 2
which proves the theorem for the star network as social optimum. ⊓⊔
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have extended a model for selfish network creation to allow for finite penalty values
for disconnectivity. Our analysis of the resulting game and disconnected Nash equilibria brings up
a number of interesting insights. All Nash (strong) equilibria of the NCG can be Nash (strong)
equilibria for the penalized game under sufficiently large penalty values. Tree structures do almost
never appear in disconnected Nash equilibria. There are cases in which the price of anarchy is
Θ(n) and thus strictly higher than in the NCG. In contrast, the strong price of anarchy remains a
constant and is at most 4. However, the increase for the price of anarchy is due to the existence
of the empty network as a Nash equilibrium. Once we can exclude emptiness of the network, we
conjecture that above a constant threshold for the penalty no disconnected non-empty Nash or
strong equilibrium exists. This would mean that for all non-empty disconnected Nash equilibria
the price of anarchy is similar to the NCG also bounded by o(nǫ). Proving or disproving this
conjecture remains as an interesting open problem. In addition, it would be interesting to observe
similar phenomena in models with different edge costs, e.g. given by hierarchical metrics as in [15].
In general, deriving a deeper understanding of the properties and structural characterizations of
Nash and strong equilibria in network creation games like the PCG is an interesting research
direction.
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